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A TRANSATLANTIC CASE:
THE DERIVATIVE ACTION AS A CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE TOOL
IRENE LYNCH FANNON*
INTRODUCTION
On May 13, 2002 a US company, Tomran Inc. filed a derivative action suit in
the City of Baltimore Circuit Court, Maryland on behalf of Allied Irish Banks,
Ireland’s leading banking organisation, against the current and former directors
of Allfirst Bank (a subsidiary of AIB based in Maryland) and against Allfirst
Bank, Allfirst Financial and AIB as nominal defendants arising from losses of
$700 million incurred by the bank as a result of the activities of a “rogue trader”.
Tomran Inc. held 4,800 American depositary shares, quoted on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), in Allied Irish Banks, plc. The derivative action suit
was heard in the first instance in the Circuit Court of the City of Baltimore,
Maryland1  and went on appeal in May 2004. The decision represents a précis
of Irish and English law on derivative actions and illustrates how inadequate
this action is as a minority protection device and how it compares unfavourably
with the state law of a number of jurisdictions in the United States.2
This article thus highlights a number of specific issues. First, how the conflict
of law issues as resolved in this case do not adequately address the rights of
*BCL (NUI), BCL (Oxon.) SJD (University of Virginia) Solicitor is a Professor at the
Faculty of Law, University College Cork, Ireland and was recently a Visiting Professor
at Cleveland State University where during the academic year 2003–2004 she held the
position of Baker Hostetler Visiting Professor. Thanks are due to Richard Nolan,
Elizabeth Boros and Brian Cheffins who were all extremely helpful when asked about
various issues arising in relation to this case. Finally, thanks are due to Dan Prentice,
Allen and Overy Professor of Corporate Law, Pembroke College Oxford for his comments
and ideas.
1. Tomran Inc. v William M. Passano, Jr. et al., Baltimore City Circuit, Matricciani J.
Case N: 24–C–02–002561.
2. In this case the primary relevant state law was either the law of New York or of
Maryland, in both cases similar to the law of Delaware in relation to the issues at
hand. For a discussion of the relevant law on this issue in these states please see M.
Dooley, Fundamentals of Corporation Law (Foundation Press, Westbury, New York,
1995), 300ff.
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certain kinds of cross-jurisdictional investors, a matter of increasing importance
in a globalised economy. This case concerns those investing in foreign
companies listed on the NYSE through the medium of ADRs or ADSs.3
Secondly, that Irish and English rules on derivative actions present severe
obstacles to the enforcement of minority shareholder rights. The article questions
orthodox support for this status quo, evidenced most recently by the approach
of the UK Company Law Review project conducted under the auspices of the
DTI.4  Finally, the article considers the “corporate history” of Allied Irish Banks
and seeks to question the relevance of corporate law to the resolution of the
governance issues highlighted by this case and subsequent events in AIB. It is
not intended to maintain that Allied Irish Banks is unusual in this context, quite
the opposite. The intention is rather to take the “rogue trading” events,
subsequent action on the part of the management, this litigation and subsequent
events as representative of a typical scenario involving a large corporation
dealing with an internal crisis. This case study illustrates the dissonance between
company law and modern commercial and corporate practice. This relationship
leaves a vacuum, which, it is argued, is currently filled by the adoption of
private remedies5  or resolution, for example the requisition of an investigation
by the management of Allied Irish Banks and its subsequent publication on the
AIB website as an attempt to ameliorate shareholders’ fears regarding
transparency. This raises a complex area of debate, which will be returned to in
later work. Part I describes the events in AIB leading to the derivative action
suit. Part II describes the jurisdiction and choice of law issues, together with
the locus standi issues faced by the plaintiff. Part III illustrates the difficulties
faced by the minority shareholder, in fact not even a shareholder but a beneficial
holder, in relation to the substantive rules on derivative actions. Part IV considers
the current reform proposals from the DTI. Part V considers the broader
governance issues.
3. American Depository Receipts and American Depository Shares. See further R.
Nolan, “Indirect Investors: A Greater Say in the Company?” (2003) 3 JCLS 73 for
a very complete description of current corporate practices in this area and for a
consideration of the UK DTI recommendations.
4. In 1998 the DTI in the United Kingdom launched a review of company law with the
establishment of an independent steering group culminating in a Final Report to the
Secretary of State in July 2001. www.dti.gov.uk/cld/final_report.
The Government published its response to the Company Law Review in a White
Paper entitled Modernising Company Law. Report Cm 5553 (2002) www.dti.gov.uk/
companiesbill/part2.pdf on foot of which, together with responses thereto, legislation
is currently being prepared. See further www.dti.gov.uk. Throughout this piece
reference will be made to the Command paper or to the Final Report and this will be
indicated where appropriate. (All websites finally accessed on July 12, 2004).
5. A growing area of corporate law scholarship in the United States considers these
problems. See generally “Symposium: Norms and Corporate Law” 149 U.Pa.L.Rev.
(2001). This scholarship is considered in the text accompanying nn.103–106 below.
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PART I : THE ROGUE TRADING SCANDAL
Allied Irish Banks plc is one of the two major banks in Ireland with banking
interests in many different sectors. Its shares are quoted on the Irish stock
exchange and on the NYSE.6  Having first begun to invest in overseas banking
operations during the 1980s, by 1988 Allied Irish Banks had acquired just under
50% of the common stock of First Maryland and in 1989 First Maryland became
a wholly owned subsidiary of AIB. It was renamed AllFirst in 1999. AllFirst
Financial, which in turn owned AllFirst Bank is based in Baltimore, Maryland
in the United States. Subsequent to the events described in this article, and in
part as a resolution of the difficulties AIB experienced with its US venture,
AllFirst was sold to M& T Bank. AIB now owns 22.5% of M& T. During most
of the time AllFirst was owned by AIB it was managed exclusively at local
level, with what has been described as a “hands off approach”, with the exception
of the appointment of one high ranking officer to the Baltimore office from
Dublin, AIB’s headquarters.7  In February 2002 it was finally discovered,
although there had been indications of trouble before this time,8  that substantial
losses to the tune of $691million were incurred during the period 1997 through
2002 by the unauthorised currency trading activities of an employee of AllFirst
Bank, John Rusnak.
Media attention gave way at the time to an investigation, which was
authorised by AIB management, designed to establish the sequence of events
and to consider questions regarding management infrastructure, governance
and oversight mechanisms in the group as a whole. The investigation eventually
led to a report on this matter, which was made available to the public.9  The
response of the Board of AIB seemed to be timely and rigorous and satisfied,
or so it seemed from media reports at that time, the need of shareholders in AIB
to discover how such actions had occurred causing substantial losses to the
company. However, some shareholders were not satisfied. In particular some
US ADS holders (American Depository Shareholders), were not satisfied either
6. In July 2004, the adjusted earnings per share for the first half of 2004 was reported
by Allied Irish Banks plc as 64.4c, up 10% on the previous half year with the same
value for the USA up 13%. See further www.aibgroup.com.
7. The factual account of events which took place at AllFirst and at AIB is derived
from a report prepared for AIB in relation to these events: Promonotory Financial
Group and Wachtell Lipton Rosen and Katz: “Report to Board of Directors of Allied
Irish Banks P.L.C., AllFirst Financial Inc., and AllFirst Bank Concerning Currency
Trading Losses” March 2002. (hereinafter referred to as “the Ludwig Report”) See
further www.aib.ie. Mr David Cronin was appointed to the senior management team
as treasurer of AllFirst in 1989 and maintained close contacts with headquarters at
AIB, Dublin throughout the entire period in question.
8. See further the Ludwig Report pp.20–25.
9. See further www.aibgroup.com.
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with the actions of the management of AllFirst or indeed with the actions of the
Board of Allied Irish Banks in relation to the fraudulent activities of individual
traders at AllFirst. Tomran Inc. holder of ADSs in AIB, first made demands10
on the chairman of AIB and of Allfirst Financial, Inc., and Allfirst Bank to take
legal action to recover these losses and indicated that if such action was not
initiated, Tomran Inc. intended to take a derivative action on behalf of Allfirst
and/or AIB to recover losses caused to the company arising from this trading.11
Although the bona fides of management in relation to the actual trading is not
in doubt, the question here is whether management can or ought to be
accountable for losses caused to the corporation as a whole through the lack of
strong governance structures. This case and its facts represent an extreme case
of loss, caused by the very unusual activities of one individual, “a lone wolf”,12
and it must be emphasized that it is not intended to exaggerate the culpability
of the management in any sense.
PART II: TOMRAN INC. v WILLIAM PASSANO JR, ET AL.13
Jurisdiction and choice of law
The first issue the Circuit Court in Baltimore addressed was the question of
jurisdiction. The first principle the court considered was the “internal affairs
doctrine” enunciated most recently by the United States Supreme Court in Edgar
v Mite Corp., et al.14  which provides that ordinarily the court (a US court) will
not interfere in the internal affairs of a foreign corporation. The defendants in
the Tomran case, particularly Allied Irish Banks, argued that this principle
presented a complete bar to the present action. The court in Baltimore decided
in favour of the plaintiffs in relation to this argument. It held that it was not
constrained by this principle for a number of different reasons including that
the acts complained of occurred in Maryland and that the evidence and witnesses
and most of the defendants were situate in Maryland as distinct from the
jurisdiction of incorporation, Ireland. The court also distinguished a decision
10. Demand letter of March 6, 2002 and of April 5, 2002. Note that the serving of a
demand letter is a procedural requirement under the law of the State of New York
and of the State of Maryland. See further Dooley, n.2 above, 305–308, on Rule 23.1
of the Federal Rules of Procedure relating to the demand letter or notice.
11. Tomran Inc. v William M. Passano, Jr. et al., Baltimore City Circuit, Matricciani J.
Case N: 24–C–02–002561.
12. Above n.7, 46.
13. Tomran Inc. v William M. Passano, Jr. et al Baltimore City Circuit, Matricciani J.
Case N: 24–C–02–002561.
14. 457 U.S. 624, 645–646 (1982).
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of the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland, NAACP v Golding,15  which
reiterated the “internal affairs doctrine” on the grounds that there were no
economic issues at stake in that case and on the grounds that the members of
that non-profit voluntary organisation had failed to exhaust their internal
remedies.
Having accepted jurisdiction over the affairs of AIB, the court went on to
consider what law would apply. Critical to the resolution of this issue was the
interpretation of the depository agreement, the agreement creating the ADSs
as a means of holding a financial interest in AIB, on the NYSE. Although the
document states that the relevant laws applicable will be those of the State of
New York,16  the court seems to have been reluctant to accept the consequences
of this statement for the defendants, which would have been to allow this action
to proceed. The court was unable to accept the plaintiff’s argument that because
the laws of the State of New York would apply the action could proceed “without
regard to Irish law”. The court also expressed reluctance to go any further in
ignoring the internal affairs doctrine than it already had by adopting a jurisdiction
that was not the place of incorporation. The court stated that underlying the
“internal affairs doctrine” was the principle that the law of the place of
incorporation governs the rights and responsibilities of the parties with respect
to its internal operations and that therefore Irish law applied to the issues at
hand. The court’s reasoning in this area is flawed. First, and most importantly,
by rejecting the argument based on the agreement that the laws of the State of
New York applied, the court offended the principle that choice of law clauses
enjoy “a presumption of validity” under US civil procedure rules, the only
proviso being that “the courts usually require that the laws chosen have some
connection with the parties or the transaction”,17  a condition that is clearly
satisfied in this case. Similarly, the ADS agreement states quite clearly that the
laws of New York should apply and although the court expressed a wish not to
contravene the spirit of the “internal affairs doctrine” it explicitly did so in
ignoring relevant provisions of a document drawn up by the corporation in
question. Furthermore the only case which had been argued before it relating
to the status of holders of ADRs was the case of Batchelder v Kawamoteo, et
al.,18  where the United States Court of Appeals had denied standing to holders
of ADRs in Honda because the agreement19  in question had indicated that
15. 342 Md. 663 (1996).
16. Para.7.6 of the ADR agreement states, “This deposit agreement and the receipts
shall be interpreted and all rights hereunder and thereunder shall be governed by
the laws of the State of New York.”
17. L.J. Silberman and A.R. Stein, Civil Procedure, Theory and Practise (Aspen Law
and Business, Boulder, CO, 2001) 175.
18. 147 F.3d.915 (CA 9 1998).
19. Note that the relevant clause in the ADR agreement in Batchelder, which led the
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Japanese law was to apply and that Japanese law limited the right to bring
shareholder actions to registered shareholders. Secondly, the court’s acceptance
of jurisdiction on the one hand, explicitly rejecting the internal affairs doctrine
for this purpose, and then choosing the law of the place of incorporation in an
attempt to comply with the spirit of the “internal affairs doctrine” on the other,
is illogical. In doing so the court took upon itself the interpretation and
administration of Irish law ultimately influencing not only the internal affairs
of AIB but also the internal affairs of many different corporations incorporated
in this jurisdiction. The outcome is that the Circuit Court of the City of Baltimore
has made the most recent pronouncement on an important aspect of Irish
company law, not to mention the single most significant event in Irish corporate
fraud in the history of the State.20
Locus standi
Once Irish law was deemed by the court to be the relevant law, the plaintiff
then faced a number of difficult issues. The first and, as it turned out, by no
means the least was the rule in s.123 of the Irish Companies Act 196321
equivalent to s.360 of the UK Companies Act 1985 which provides that “No
notice of any trust, express, implied or constructive shall be entered on the
register or receivable by the registrar.” In effect this means that in the normal
course all rights and liabilities as between the company and its shareholders
are exercisable by and against those registered as members. The difficulties
faced by beneficial owners of shares in this context and in particular holders of
modern financial instruments such as ADRs and ADSs have been addressed
recently by the DTI (UK) Company Law Review project, and some
recommendations were made to ameliorate these difficulties.22  The UK
government has now considered these recommendations, and a White Paper
has been produced outlining the map of future legislation.23  Nolan also provides
court to apply Japanese law in that case, was very similar in language to the clause
in the present ADR agreement which stated that the law of the State of New York
should apply.
20. Finally, even if the choice of law clause in the agreement was not supported by the
court, the court had already acknowledged that most of the actions, evidence and
witnesses arose and occurred around the affairs of a corporation operating in the
state of Maryland and for this reason it could have opted to apply the laws of that
state.
21. This act is still referred to as “the Principal Act” even though there have been
substantial amendments to Irish company law in 1990 and most recently in 2003.
22. See further Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy-Final Report of The
Company Law Steering Group Chapter 7, Para. 7.4. www.dti.gov.uk/cld/final_report.
See also Nolan, above n.3.
23. See Cm 5553 Sections 2.40 and Sections 2.41. www.dti.gov.uk/companiesbill/
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very thoroughly researched material on the companies that have sought to redress
the fact that holders of these instruments are effectively disenfranchised, but it
would seem that most of these private agreements simply address rights to
vote, to exercise proxy votes or to issue instructions to the depository.24  What
does not seem to be addressed is the difficulty faced by this ADS holder, i.e.
the rights to take action to remedy a particular wrong or grievance, in other
words the right to litigate. In the absence of any statements in the ADS agreement
the court was left to consider existing Irish law on the subject. Unfortunately
there is no modern Irish or English decision on the question of whether a
beneficial owner of shares is entitled to take a derivative action on behalf of the
company. Nor are there any statutory statements to this effect. However,
Pennington25  states that “A derivative action may be brought by a person who
is entitled to shares or an interest in them but is not registered as the holder of
them in the company’s register of members; such persons include an equitable
mortgagee of shares or the renouncee of a letter of allotment of shares, but not
a creditor of the company” The following cases are cited to support this
proposition: Bagshaw v Eastern Union Rly Co.26  and Binney v Ince Hall Coal
and Channel Co.27  The case law thus relied on by the plaintiff included
statements from older English cases which seemed to recognise a right of action
generally for the beneficial holder of shares despite the administrative rule of
convenience set out in s.123 of the Irish Companies Act of 1963 or its English
equivalent s.360. In the first mentioned case of Bagshaw v Eastern Union Rly
Co. the plaintiff was the holder of a scrip certificate,28  but not a registered
part2.pdf. The statement contained in s. 123 of the Irish 1963 Act has also been
considered by the Irish Company Law Review Group. The reform proposals will be
considered below.
24. See Nolan, above n.3. Appendix. Indeed the Deposit Agreement under which Tomran
Inc., held its ADRs also had these permissive provisions.
25. R. Pennington, Company Law (8th ed., Butterworths, London, 2001) 798. In a treatise
on Minority Shareholders’ Remedies, Boros states at page 189 that in Australia, it
has been held that a person who is merely an equitable owner of shares is not
permitted to take a derivative action and she refers to two Australian cases to support
this view, Mass v McIntosh (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 441 and Hooker Investments
Property. Ltd. v Email Ltd. (1986) 10 ACLR 443. However, she goes on to state,
“The position in England on this issue is less clear.” This is also true of the Irish
position. She then refers to an earlier edition of Pennington’s Company Law, see
above, which contains the statement outlined in the text. See E. Boros, Minority
Shareholder Remedies (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995).
26. (1849) 7 Hare 114.
27. (1866) 35 L.J. Ch. 363.
28. The terms of the scrip certificate provided for the payment of a number of instalments
of capital by the scrip holder and that once all instalments were paid the holder
would be entitled to £500 of stock of the company. The scrip certificates were
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shareholder, in relation to certain shares and sought to prevent the company
and its directors from misapplying £100,000, which had been raised to construct
one particular railway line, in expenditure on the construction of another. The
company and the individual directors argued against the substance of the action,
but also argued that the plaintiff had no standing to sue on behalf of both the
owners of registered shares and on behalf of the owners of scrip certificates, as
the interests of both “were conflicting with respect to the question in the
cause”.29  It was argued that the plaintiff could not properly represent both
interests.
Sir James Wigram V-C dismissed these objections and held in favour of the
plaintiff both in relation to the substance of the claim and in relation to what he
called objections “taken to the frame of the bill”30  which in his view required
“much consideration”.31  He pointed out that it was not argued that the plaintiff
as the owner of the scrip certificate did not have sufficient interest in the
application of the capital of the company necessary for him to take the action,
(the objection was more based on the potential conflict of interest), and he
went on to state that this could not have been argued because of the fact “that
there was an inchoate right in such parties to become general shareholders in
the company”.32
In conclusion, it would seem therefore, that even though the plaintiff at the
time of the action was not a registered shareholder his “inchoate rights” as a
shareholder and his consequent interest in the application of the capital of the
company supported his right to take action in this case. In addition, on the basis
of pure contract law principles the plaintiff also had a right as the assignee of
the original subscriber to sue the company on the contract.
In the second case of Binney v Ince Hall Coal and Channel Co. the court
specifically considered the effect of Article 142 of the Articles of the defendant
company which stated the rule which is now codified in section 123 of the Irish
1963 Act and section 360 of its English equivalent. That Article provided that
the company would not be “affected by notices of any trust relating to any
share or shares in the company …”. In this case a shareholder charged his
shares to the plaintiff as security by way of equitable mortgage, for a loan of
3000 guineas. The company had notice of this charge. The plaintiff, as equitable
mortgagee of the shares, instituted proceedings to prevent the company from
using 10,000 guineas worth of profits in a particular way, when the profits
could have been used to pay dividends. The company argued that the plaintiff
assignable with the assignee, as in this case, then becoming liable for the calls on
the certificate and entitled, when all calls were paid, to be registered as a shareholder.
29. (1849) 7 Hare 114 at 116.
30. Ibid. at 130.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
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had no right to sue based on, inter alia, Article 142 . Kindersley V-C held that
this argument “could not be maintained.” He went on to state that the effect of
the clause is:
“that … although they [the company] … have notice that A is a share-
holder, and B is a cestui que trust [the beneficial owner], payment of
dividend to the person standing on the books shall, nothwithstanding the
notice of the trust, be a good discharge. That is the whole effect of this
clause. But is does not preclude a cestui que trust of A’s shares from
coming and saying “Do not pay my trustee the monies as if they belonged
to him, but pay them to me.” Nor does it preclude the plaintiff from coming
to the company and saying, “You are injuring these shares in respect of a
right which attached to them…”.33
Otherwise, Kindersley V-C held that the company would be entitled to provide
that “whatever injustice we choose to perpetrate there shall be no remedy against
that injustice in any Court of equity.”34
This case provides clear authority for the proposition that an individual
with a beneficial interest in registered shares is entitled to seek an equitable
remedy as against the company and supports the statement of Pennington that
“ A derivative action may be brought by a person who is the equitable owner of
shares, such as an equitable mortgagee or the renouncee of a letter of allotment,
but not by a creditor of a company.” There is no reason to suppose that these
authorities should not be followed in Ireland and they are indeed supported by
the statement of the former Chief Justice, Mr Justice Keane35  who states in his
text on Irish company law that “The court indeed will intervene by injunction
at the instance of the equitable owner to prevent a transaction being completed
which would adversely affect its interest in the shares.” He does not elaborate.
Finally, Forde36  reiterates the principle stated in the Binney case (although he
does not refer to this case) when he states that “a beneficial owner can obtain
orders against the trustee and indeed the company in order to protect his interest
in the shares” noting that “[T]he effect of Article 737  is not that the company
shall never be affected by a trust or that no trust shall be created on any share,
but that the company is not to be affected by any notice of a trust.”38
33. (1866) 35 L.J. Ch. 363 at 368.
34. Ibid.
35. R. Keane, Company Law (Butterworths, Dublin, 2000), p.280.
36. M. Forde, Company Law (3rd ed., Round Hall, Sweet and Maxwell, Dublin, 1999),
pp.386–387.
37. Standard form Articles of Association, which repeats section 123 of the 1963 Act.
38. M. Forde, above n.36, 387 (emphasis added). Forde refers to the decision of Kelly
L.J. in McGrattan v McGrattan [1985] N.I. 28 where it was held that a resolution
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Based on these older cases the plaintiff’s argument was that because a
derivative action is an equitable action and because if denied locus standi the
holder of ADS (or indeed ADRs) would be left without a remedy, the court
should accept that on the authority of these cases the beneficial holder of shares
would be recognised by an Irish court. The defendant countered with two
authorities, Hooker Investments Pty. Ltd. v Email, Ltd.39  and Svanstrom v.
Jonasson40  which effectively decided that in those jurisdictions, New South
Wales and the Cayman Islands respectively, the beneficial holder of shares
would have no action. Having accepted its jurisdiction to interpret Irish law,
the court stated that it found itself “in the unenviable position of having to
interpret a critical point of Irish corporation law in the absence of any direct
authority from the Irish courts.” The court went on to state that although “the
plaintiff has constructed a well reasoned argument as to how and why an Irish
court should extend whatever rights registered shareholders have to sue a
company derivatively to beneficial owners of shares”, it was not the function
of that court to “predict the direction in which Irish courts may head in the
future when presented with an appropriate case of this nature.” In the absence
of clear authority to support the plaintiff’s contention the court refused to extend
locus standi to the plaintiffs.
The court’s view that the cases cited by the plaintiff and the cases cited by
the defendant had equally convincing precedential weight in Irish law is
questionable. Cases of the vintage of Bagshaw, Binney etc. are clearly more
central to Irish law generally, not to mention the fact that Foss v Harbottle41  is
of similar vintage and decided by the same judge as Bagshaw and this is
supported by normal rules of precedent in Irish law.42  Furthermore, in the
Northern Irish decision of McGrattan v McGrattan43  the Court of Appeal in
Northern Ireland (Kelly L.J., Hutton J. concurring) cited and approved the
decision in Binney v Ince Hall Coal and Channel Co. Kelly L.J. stated that
“Article 7 [equivalent to section 123 of the 1963 Act] does not operate to prevent
an equitable owner of shares obtaining an order from the court designed to
protect his equitable interests, even if that order operates against the company
as well as against the trustee of the shares.”44  If pre-1922 law is not clear on a
matter, then an Irish court is free to consider decisions from other jurisdictions
which was carried on the strength of votes cast by a trustee against the wishes of the
beneficial owner was invalid.
39. (1986) 10 A.C.L.R. 443.
40. (1997) C.I.L.R. 192.
41. (1843) 2 Hare 461.
42. This is a simple statement and leaves aside the principles applicable to Constitutional
review which presents a different set of issues.
43. [1985] N.I. 28.
44. Ibid. at 34.
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as having persuasive authority. Given the statement of Chief Justice Keane in
his text it would seem unlikely that an Irish court would accept that a decision
from the Cayman Islands would have sufficient weight to cast doubt on this
line of authority. Finally, the principle which prevents a court from adopting
laws in the choice of law context which may yield a favourable or less favourable
outcome for the plaintiff45  is analogous to the argument made here that certain
jurisdictions, the Cayman Islands being one of them, hold themselves out as
areas where business can be conducted secretly with less disclosure obligations
than other jurisdictions and that their company law jurisprudence should be
considered in that context. Therefore it is hard to accept that a decision from
such a jurisdiction would have similar weight to English decisions in an Irish
court.46
The group structure: double and triple derivative suits
In an amended filing on August 14 the plaintiff styled its action as a triple
derivative action in an attempt to address issues raised by the group structure
between AIB and the various subsidiaries in Maryland. The plaintiff Tomran
Inc. was a holder of ADSs in Allied Irish Bank, and the main corporate cause
of action seemed to be against the officers of the institution where the actual
fraud occurred, namely in the currency trading section of AllFirst Bank, thus
the cause of action was on the part of a second tier subsidiary against the directors
of a second tier subsidiary. As the subsidiaries were wholly owned the decision
to act rested with the parent, the only shareholder. The derivative action was
therefore an attempt on the part of an external shareholder in the parent to force
the parent to act. Thus the action was described as a triple derivative action
involving piercing the veil of not one but two companies to establish the
connection between the plaintiff and the ultimate defendants. These actions
45. See further Silberman and Stein, above n.17.
46. The Cayman Islands is familiar to Irish lawyers as the locus of the centre of an
offshore banking structure which led to substantial investigative efforts on the part
of the Irish State in the 1990s in relation to tax avoidance by many senior political
and business individuals in Ireland. See further The Report of the Inspectors
appointed to the High Court to enquire into the affairs of Ansbacher (Cayman) Ltd.,
Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement, Department of Enterprise and
Employment, Dublin, Ireland. www.odce.ie. See also many articles in The Irish
Times including for example Saturday, July 31, 1999 where it is stated that “The
investigative tribunal had made unsuccessful application to the courts in the Cayman
Islands for information regarding Ansbacher (Cayman) Ltd. This bank was a
subsidiary of a South African banking group, FirstRand which has since been sold.
The two cases cited by the defendants are also somewhat problematic as authority.
A complete analysis of why these cases are problematic will be returned to in a later
case note.
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have been recognised in the United States since at least the latter part of the
nineteenth century47  particularly where the plaintiff is a shareholder in a group
structure based on wholly owned subsidiaries, which was the case here.
As the Kansas Supreme Court put it almost 125 years ago, while upholding
plaintiffs’ right to pursue a double derivative claim, “If any other rule were
adopted, the plaintiffs would be denied all relief, and the wrongs of which they
complain would go unredressed. Even if the directors and officers of these
corporations were willing to prosecute, it would be a mockery to permit a suit
against themselves to be brought and prosecuted under their management to
obtain the relief sought in this action.”48
No authorities in England or in Ireland have addressed the legitimacy of
this approach nor does it seem to have been the case that such an action has
been accepted in Australia.49  Finally, although a moot point then because of
the judgment of the court and now because of the sale of the AIB interest, the
court in Baltimore did observe, having referred to the most recent Irish cases,
in particular Crindle Investments v Wymes50  and O’Neill v Ryan51  that “nothing
in the above quoted language or in the text of either of those decisions suggest
to this Court that Ireland is about to permit double or triple derivative actions
47. See, e.g., Ryan v Leavenworth, A. & N. Ry. Co., 21 Kan. 365, 1879 W.L. 731, *23
(1879); United States Lines, Inc. v United States Lines Co., 96 F.2d 148, 151 (2d.
Cir. 1938); Wachsman v Tobacco Prods. Corp., 129 F.2d 815, 816 (3d. Cir. 1942);
Goldstein v Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422, 425 (2d. Cir. 1944); Saltzman v Birrell, 78
F.Supp. 778, 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Hirshhorn v Mine Safety Appliances Co., 106
F.Supp. 594, 600 (W.D. Pa. 1952); Penn Central Sec. Litig., 335 F.Supp. 1026,
1036 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Gadd v Pearson, 351 F.Supp. 895, 900-01 (M.D. Fla. 1972);
Rales v Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 1993). Fletcher, “Encyclopedia of the
Law of Private Corporations” § 5977 (perm. ed. 2001); Wright, Miller & Kane,
“Federal Practice & Procedure” § 1826, pp. 48–49 (1986).
48. Ryan, above n.47. 1879 WL, 23. Brown v Tenney explains: “Without triple or double
derivative suits [a] shareholder of record in the holding company would … be without
remedy, even where, as here, the holding company is the wrongdoer. The additional
layer in the corporate structure would prevent the righting of many wrongs and
would insulate the wrongdoer from judicial intervention. The law, however, cannot
be deceived by specious and illusory devices, disguises, or circuitry of action”
(author’s emphasis) 532 N.E. 2d 230, 233 (Ill. 1988).
49. E. Boros, Minority Shareholder Remedies (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995).
50. [1998] 4 I.R. 567; [1998] 2 I.L.R.M. 275.
51. [1993] I.L.R.M. 557. This case is not central to the law on derivative actions, such
as it is. The plaintiff was aggrieved, inter alia, by alleged collusion between a number
of the defendants contrary to Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty on anti-competitive
practices, clearly a cause of action for the corporation alone and not the individual
shareholder. The distinction between wrongs of third parties and wrongs internal to
the company mentioned earlier is apt.
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by even registered shareholders”. In contrast the state of New York and the
state of Maryland recognise these actions, yet again underlining the much less
restrictive approach to derivative actions in the United States.
In conclusion, the lack of standing of the beneficial owner was fatal to its
claim. In view of the fact that ADRs and ADSs are becoming increasingly
important vehicles for companies to facilitate investment through foreign
ownership, a reconsideration of these rules is timely.52  In addition to the reforms
currently canvassed in the UK and by the Irish Company Law Review Group,
serious consideration ought to be given to the fact that failure to restate the law
in this area may present significant procedural barriers to litigation by beneficial
owners and cause considerable injustice to those enticed to invest through
various equitable vehicles in a particular corporation. The reform proposals
are considered below.
PART III: THE DERIVATIVE ACTION AS A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEVICE
Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461
Even if the plaintiff had managed to overcome this difficulty the problems in
relation to a viable derivative action claim seem almost insurmountable. This
part of the paper raises serious questions in a governance context as to whether
the derivative action as currently understood provides the shareholder with any
meaningful remedy at all. Even with the procedural clarifications presented in
the recommendations from the Scottish and English Commission which were
adopted by the Company Law Review Steering Group during the DTI company
law review project53  it is doubtful that the shareholder would ever have a good
chance of success, let alone go any distance in establishing a credible case.
The rule in Foss v Harbottle is quite simply a majority rule principle and
nothing more. Interestingly, in the judgment of Sir James Wigram V–C in that
case the court accepted the rule that in most cases the corporation will be the
proper plaintiff but not without strongly worded statements that the rule was
“much too broadly stated on the part of the Defendants.”54  Sir Wigram went
52. See further Nolan, above n.3. The DTI Company Law Review Steering Group Report
suggested reforms in this area which are considered in this article along with existing
company practices. See further The Company Law Review Steering Group, “Modern
Company Law for a Competitive Economy—Final Report”, Chap.7, para.7.4.
53. See “Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy-Final Report of The
Company Law Steering Group”; Chap.7 Corporate Governance: Shares and
Shareholders. Paras.[7.46–7.51]. www.dti.gov.uk/cld/final_report and the Law
Commission’s earlier paper Consultation Paper of July 1996. No. 142 and Final
Report of October 1997 Law Commission N. 246.
54. Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 491.
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on to state that:
“If a case should arise of injury to a corporation by some of its members,
for which no adequate remedy remained, except that of a suit by individual
corporators in their private characters, and asking in such character the
protection of those rights to which in their corporate character they were
entitled, I cannot but think that the principle so forcibly laid down by
Lord Cottenham in Wallworth v Holt55  and other cases, would apply, and
the claims of justice would be found superior to any difficulties arising
out of technical rules respecting the mode in which corporations are
required to sue.”56
In Irish and English company law, four exceptions to the rule are normally
described as follows:
(a) Where the majority purports to act illegally or ultra vires.
(b) Where decisions are made requiring more than a simple majority.
(c) Where actions are taken which “abridge or abolish” the individual rights
of shareholders.
(d) Where a majority in control of the company commits a “fraud on the
minority”.
A fifth exception referring to “the justice of the case” has also been canvassed
in the Irish and English decisions beginning with statements of Jessel M.R. in
Russell v Wakefield Waterworks Co.57  For more recent dicta to this effect see
Harman L.J. in the English case of Heyting v Dupont58  and in Ireland in the
case of Moylan v Irish Whiting Manufacturers Ltd59  where Hamilton J. referred
specifically to the need to ensure the protection of constitutionally protected
property rights. Against this fifth exception Keane states that:
“the exceptions to the rule are so clearly defined that in practice the Irish
courts would be reluctant to extend them. In support of this approach, it
may be pointed out that, provided the term ‘fraud’ is given its wider
equitable meaning, the number of cases in which the invocation of the
‘justice of the case’ formula is necessary must be so few as not to justify
the making of additional exceptions, with the undesirable consequence
of uncertainty as to what the law is.”60
55. 4 Myl. & Cr. 635.
56. (1843) 2 Hare 461, 492 (emphasis added).
57. (1875) L.R. 20 Eq. 474.
58. [1963] 3 All E.R. 97.
59. Unreported, High Court, April 14, 1980).
60. Keane, above n. 35, 317. See also L. Sealy, Cases and Materials on Company Law
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In Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v Newman Industries Ltd. (No.2),61  the
exception of fraud on the minority was examined in great detail by Vinelott J.
in his decision in the Court of Chancery in this case. On appeal62  the Court of
Appeal no longer had to consider this issue because, as Sealy states,63  “the
company itself (in whose favour the judgment of the lower court had been
entered) had adopted the plaintiff’s case and the benefit of the victory.” The
Court of Appeal was therefore not faced with many of the substantive issues
surrounding Foss v Harbottle, but did make some observations, which are
generally accepted as underlining the restrictive approach to derivative actions
under English law. In particular the Court of Appeal rejected the idea that there
is a broad exception to the rule under the “interests of justice” category.64  In
the passage cited from Wigram V–C this broader interpretation of the rule is
however contemplated in the language he uses. Nevertheless, Keane’s view
that fraud may be broad enough to cover the justice category is the starting
point of the next section.
The meaning of fraud
In this case Tomran Inc. sought to bring itself under the fraud on the minority
exception. The question is whether any of the management behaviour outlined
in the Ludwig Report could be caught within the meaning generally given to
fraud on the minority. The use of the term “fraud” is generally acknowledged
not to be equivalent to fraudulent activities involving dishonesty and even less
so criminality, but is understood as indicating situations where “a person
entrusted with powers to be exercised on behalf of others used them for some
other purpose.”65  Cases in England and Ireland (which are relatively few in
number) decided under this exception have usually involved expropriation by
a controlling majority of the company’s property. However, a recent Irish case
(6th ed., 2001), 502 where he observes that the importance of the English Court of
Appeal’s decision in Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v Newman Industries Ltd. (No.2)
[1982] 1 Ch. 204 may be that the court “declined to give any encouragement to the
notion that the rule in Foss v Harbottle might be due for some relaxation in the
broad interests of justice.”
61. [1981] 1 Ch. 257.
62. [1982] 1 Ch. 204.
63. Above n.60, 503.
64. [1982] 1 Ch. 204 at 221. See below for further discussion of this case in relation to
the distinction between personal rights of a minority shareholder enforceable through
a s.459 action under the English Companies Act 1985 or a section 205 action under
the Irish Companies Act 1963.
65. Keane: above n.35, 311. Similar statements made in earlier editions are quoted with
approval by MacCann L.: “The Rule in Foss v Harbottle, Recent Developments”
[1990] I.L.T. 68 at 70. Authorities in England support the broad reach of the term
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did involve the court reviewing a decision by a controlling majority not to
settle an action. Similarly, decisions not to sue could also be the proper subject
matter of a derivative action. In Crindle Investments v Wymes66  the test set
down by the Irish Supreme Court was whether the majority were seeking to
“appropriate benefits to themselves to the detriment of the company as a whole”
but it was held in that case that any decision of the majority not to settle the
action (regarded as unjustified intransigence by the minority) would benefit
the minority as well as the majority if proved to be a successful strategy. On the
facts as presented in the Ludwig report, the governance question focuses on
the decision by the Board as a whole not to sue some of its members. Accordingly
the demand letter issued by Tomran Inc. indicates a view that a corporate action
might lie for gross negligence and therefore a breach of the directors’ duties of
skill and care owed to the company. An action might also lie alleging breach of
the directors’ duties not to abuse their powers or to exercise their powers for
proper purpose. If that is so, then for the minority shareholder the concern is
why the Board has not taken such an action on behalf of the company against
these errant directors. The English case of Daniels v Daniels67  is in point. In
his judgment Templeman J. distinguishes between cases where directors have
been negligent or even grossly negligent where it would seem that even in the
latter case no derivative action would lie, and on the other hand cases where
there is improper purpose or indeed gross negligence coupled with the possibility
of benefit accruing to the directors personally. Possibly there may have been a
benefit accruing to the Board of AIB and officers of AllFirst Financial in making
a decision not to sue some of their number on behalf of the corporations, despite
the formal demand letter sent to the Board by Tomran, so that disclosure of
further culpability in the course of litigation would be avoided.68  This kind of
benefit is adumbrated in the judgment in the Irish case of Crindle69  where the
court was of the view that because a decision to litigate against a third party
would be equally beneficial to all concerned if successful and equally detrimental
to all if not, such a decision would not be within the exceptions to Foss v
Harbottle. However, if the communality of interests is tainted where the potential
“fraud on the minority”. Sealy: above n.60, 502. The issue of whether the exception
is wide enough to cover actions other than fraud as such was also answered in the
affirmative in Daniels v Daniels [1978] Ch. 406 where Templeman J. stated that the
exception could not be drawn so narrowly that directors could profit from their own
negligence.
66. [1998] 4 I.R. 567.
67. [1978] Ch. 406.
68. Above text accompanying n.10. Note that the formal demand letter is part of the
procedural requirements for this type of action under the law of the relevant states
in the United States.
69. Above n. 66.
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defendants are not third parties but some of the Board, there is a conflict of
interest and that may turn negligence into fraud.70  This problem may be
addressed by subjecting the decision makers to closer scrutiny regarding their
independence and this will be considered in the context of reform.
In the Ludwig report it was quite clearly stated that the review found nothing
to indicate “that anyone at AIB or Allfirst, outside of the Allfirst treasury group,
were involved in, or had any knowledge that, fraudulent or improper trading
activity was occurring at Allfirst before the discovery of the fraud.”71  In other
words, no evidence of per se fraud. Nevertheless the review did find that “Mr
Rusnak’s (the trader’s) trading activities did not receive the careful scrutiny
that they deserved; the Allfirst treasurer and his treasury funds manager-the
principal persons responsible for Mr Rusnak’s supervision-failed for an extended
period to monitor Mr Rusnak’s trading.”72  Secondly it is stated that at both
AIB and Allfirst level all of those involved in risk assessment including senior
management, risk managers and internal auditors at Allfirst, did not appreciate
the risks involved in the hedge-fund style of foreign exchange trading conducted
by Mr Rusnak and even in the absence of fraud his activities “warranted much
closer risk-management review.” The report also states that the “heavy reliance”
by senior management of Allfirst and AIB on the Allfirst treasurer was
“misplaced”.73  Finally, the report goes on to make very specific recom-
mendations on management issues. Some of these recommendations clearly
indicate that the decision to permit proprietary trading was made without
addressing the risks and costs involved (which are high) weighed against the
potential gains (low) and that this trading was not adequately supervised or
managed.74  As the Company Law Review Steering Group acknowledged in
certain situations directors may have a “personal interest in condoning the
wrong” or at least avoiding the risk of litigation and extensive discovery. That
is not to exclude the legitimacy of deciding not to litigate because of further
costs and damage to the company.
70. It is interesting that in Foss v Harbottle Wigram V–C specifically refers to injury
caused “to the corporation by some of its members, for which no adequate remedy
remained” ((1843) 2 Hare 461, 492) as distinct, I believe, from injury caused by
third parties where the corporate response is likely to be more coherent. This
distinction is apt in considering the Irish case of O’Neill v Ryan and Ors [1990]
I.L.R.M. 140 and [1993] I.L.R.M. 557.
71. Above n.7, 3.
72. Above n.7, 2.
73. Above n.7, 2 and 3.
74. Above n.7, 45 and 46.
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Ratification
In Daniels v Daniels Templeman J. addressed the defence that such actions are
ratifiable and are therefore not within the exception to the rule in Foss v
Harbottle. He states:
“In Pavlides v Jensen [1956] Ch. 565 it was alleged that the directors had
been guilty of gross negligence. … Danckwerts J. struck out the statement
of claim as disclosing no cause of action because no fraud was pleaded….
Mr Richards relies very strongly on this decision as showing that, whatever
the exceptions to Foss v Harbottle may be, mere gross negligence is not
actionable, and he says all that is pleaded in the present case is gross
negligence at the most. But in Pavlides v Jensen no benefits accrued to
the directors …”.75
He concludes that shareholders must put up with “foolish or unwise directors”76
and even “an amiable set of lunatics” but
 “a minority shareholder who has no other remedy may sue where directors
use their powers, intentionally or unintentionally, fraudulently or
negligently, in a manner which benefits themselves at the expense of the
company.”77
The Tomran case reflects the core problem considered by Sir Wigram in the
middle of the 19th century, the question of what can be done when the Board
does not bring its own members to account. The fraud on the minority exception
is not based on negligence because this negligence, or even lunacy, is ratifiable.
Rather, self-interest is the key to what is meant by fraud on the minority and it
is always possible for a decision not to sue to be tainted by self-interest. Despite
the report and despite the departure of a number of executives and the ongoing
investigations by US authorities, AIB and its subsidiaries has not recovered
any of the almost $700m losses it suffered.
Control by the wrongdoers
Even in the somewhat unlikely event that a court were to accept the decision
not to sue as a ground for an exception to the Foss v Harbottle rule under the
category of “fraud”, the plaintiff has to show that the wrongdoers are in control.
The issue of control was considered in detail in Foss v Harbottle itself where
75. [1978] Ch. 406 at 413 (emphasis added).
76. Ibid. at 414, citing Lord Hatherley L.C. in Turquand v Marshall (1868–1869) L.R.
4 Ch. App. 376 at 386.
77. [1978] Ch. 406 at 414 (emphasis added).
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the court states:
“How then can this Court act in a suit constituted as this is, if it is to be
assumed, for the purposes of the argument, that the powers of the body of
the proprietors are still in existence …… the governing body of proprietors
may defeat the decree [of the court] by lawfully resolving upon the
confirmation of the very acts which are the subject of the suit. … In order
then that this suit may be sustained it must be shewn either that there is
no such power as I have supposed remaining in the proprietors, or at
least, that all means have been resorted to and found ineffectual to set
that body in motion. …”78
Thus the question of whether the decision to litigate rests with the Board of
Directors or with the shareholders in general meeting is pertinent. If it is the
latter, Keane79  has expressed the view that in Irish law “it is accordingly
important for the aggrieved shareholder to take all the steps open to him to
convene an extraordinary general meeting before he issues proceedings.”
Alternatively, “the court may as we have seen convene a meeting itself and
would probably do so before embarking on a lengthy trial of the merits in a
case when it had not been clearly established that the wrongdoers were in
control.”80
However, this may not always be practical or appropriate. Sealy81  observes
that this rule is “anachronistic” and ignores the fact that the Board of Directors
may have exclusive competence to take the decision to sue. Vinelott J. in his
decision at first instance in Prudential Assurance observed that even if such a
procedural step were required, in a large company the directors alleged to be
liable “might be able to determine the outcome of a resolution in a general
meeting in their own favour by the use of proxy votes”82  and he also pointed
out that most company Articles of Association vest the management of the
business of the company in the Board and that such an article vesting the
discretion to sue in the directors “cannot be overridden by a resolution of the
general meeting.”83  On balance therefore in this case, there may be no steps
open to the aggrieved shareholder prior to issuing the proceedings.
To address this issue many US jurisdictions outline a set of procedural steps
that enable the plaintiff litigant to overcome these obstacles. In contrast under
English and Irish law there are no clear procedural steps to be taken equivalent
78. (1843) 2 Hare 461 at 494.
79. Keane, above n.35, 319.
80. Ibid.
81. Sealy, above n.60, 503.
82. [1981] 1 Ch. 257 at 324.
83. Ibid.
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to the demand stage under the law of the states of Maryland and New York, and
there is no clarity as to the establishment of a “special litigation committee” of
the Board of Directors or any equivalent body as indicated by the law of those
states. The reform proposals will be considered in the next part.
PART IV: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The standing of beneficial owners
In relation to standing, the DTI Company Law Review Steering Group
considered the position of the beneficial owner of shares. The need for reform
of this area is driven by the development of a multiplicity of ownership structures,
many of them developed to facilitate investment in companies including, for
example, ownership arising from the CREST system of share trading. The
regulation of foreign securities trading in the US, which dictates the need to
use ADR and ADS agreements in relation to foreign companies trading on the
NYSE, is another. Having considered the Steering Group proposals in relation
to s. 360 of the UK Companies Act of which s. 123 of the Irish Act is an
equivalent, the UK Government White Paper makes the following broad ranging
recom-mendation “the law should be amended so as to make clear that
companies are able to recognise, if they wish, rights of holder of beneficial
interests in shares at the request of the registered member”,84  but it rejected a
further recom-mendation made by the DTI review group regarding the possibility
of compelling some companies in some cases to recognise the beneficial
shareowner. It is stated that the “practicality of extending a power of compulsion
through statutory instrument to compel companies to recognise rights is being
considered.”85  These views are also echoed in Nolan’s article86  and supported
by his empirical research demonstrating that many quoted companies, their
intermediaries and beneficial shareholders have already adopted a voluntary or
privately agreed system. The fact is that such voluntary arrangements would
not have assisted the plaintiff in this case and they would have been left similarly
without a remedy as the ADS agreement in this case did not provide for such
an eventuality and it is believed that the type of agreement used here is standard
form. Nolan does state that the “beneficiary can always take court action to
recognise his/her rights” 87  but no authority is given for this proposition.88
84. Cm 5553: “White Paper: Modernising Company Law: The Government’s Policy”,
para.2.40.
85. Ibid., para.2.41. These recommendations are now incorporated in Clause E of the
draft Companies Bill.
86. Above, n.3.
87. Above, n.3, 79.
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Given this current position any document such as an ADR or ADS agreement
creates a set of rights that are not clearly identified. The decisions in Tomran
and in the other cases which are considered in the judgment, in particular the
modern cases which were followed, underline the unsatisfactory position of
the beneficial shareholder in comparison with that of a registered shareholder.
Where the purpose of an ADR agreement or ADS agreement is to facilitate
investment by US residents in “foreign companies” it would seem to be
unacceptable that the legislative framework which exists in these “foreign
jurisdictions” does not match up to the expectations of the investors. The effect
of current legal rules is to defeat the rights of beneficial holders of such securities.
Given the reform proposals as they currently stand, with the emphasis placed
on voluntary recognition, the barring of claims, such as those in the present
case or indeed under section 459 of the English legislation providing a remedy
for “unfair prejudice” or the similar section 205 of the Irish Companies Act
1963 on oppression hearings, will still be a reality. The Irish Company Law
Review Group has not addressed this problem to date.
Reform of the derivative action
In its final report the UK Company Law Review Steering Group addressed the
circumstances in which a shareholder would be entitled to redress against the
company. The report endorsed the previous proposals from the Law
Commission89  which included restricting the right of action to breach of
directors’ duties only, but this would include breaches of duties of skill and
care. The report went on to address two other questions. First it raised a question
about the extent to which decisions not to sue by the board or, alternatively,
ratification of the directors’ actions present or ought to present a bar to the
action. Secondly, it considered the question as to whether issues concerning
the admissibility or otherwise of a derivative action should be embodied in
legislative form. In relation to these questions the report went on to state that
there was a strong case for “simplifying the law on ratification”, a statement
that most would find hard to disagree with.90  It also recommended that questions
surrounding the validity of decisions to ratify a wrong on the company by the
directors, whether this involved fraud or not, and the validity of decisions by
members of the board not to pursue such a wrong should depend on whether
the necessary majority had been reached without the need to rely on the votes
of the wrongdoers or on those who were substantially under their influence or
88. A reference is made in this part of the text to Part 73 of the Civil Procedure Rules
which seem to be concerned with the granting of stop orders and so forth.
89. Above n.53, para.5.82.
90. Above n.53, para.5.84.
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who had a personal interest in condoning the wrong (author’s emphasis). In
relation to the second category of issues, the report recommended that where a
wrong was not lawfully ratified nor a decision not to sue lawfully taken the
best test of whether a derivative action should proceed was whether the
minority’s views on the question were the best available evidence of what was
in the best interests of the company. If a majority of independent shareholders
favoured not pursuing the wrong or ratifying it, that should prevent such an
action. The decision to proceed would conceivably rest with the court on a
discretionary basis at the case management stage.
The DTI proposals were put forward to clarify a remedy which has always
been available to shareholders since the middle of the 19th century. Even with
these proposals areas of uncertainty can be predicted. Whilst it seems acceptable
to limit the action to decisions of the directors, questions arise, as they always
have, regarding the role of the independent majority. On the facts of this case
and many others of its kind, how is it possible for the independent majority to
be formed? If there is no ratification or indeed no decision to sue or not to sue
as in this case, what will the position of the shareholder be? Will the court have
a role at the case management stage in convening the meeting to ratify or to
consider a suit? Will the court give directions as to who may vote at either
meeting? These questions are not raised in a petulant way, but are merely some
of the questions that occur even now for a minority shareholder trying to take
an action. Keane did say that the shareholder ought, given the current state of
the law on derivative actions, take any steps open to it to achieve clarification
between the minority view and what was perceived to be the view of the majority,
but also acknowledged that in a large modern company this could be almost
impossible. One can only conclude that if the proposals were accepted, the
court’s case management role could be quite extensive.
PART V: THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES
Minority shareholder protection as a requirement of good governance
The first question in this final part relates to the majority rule principle. It is
argued that the effect of the rule in Foss v Harbottle has been overstated,
particularly in the last 50 years or so, by corporate law scholars in the British
Isles and in other parts of the commonwealth. Coincidentally this has occurred
as corporate and managerial power has increasingly become a cause for concern
for all scholars interested in corporate governance issues. In contrast in the
United States, despite a similar principle of majority rule, the derivative action
provides a healthy cause of action for a minority shareholder. (Although not
intending to compare the purpose and effectiveness of the “unfair prejudice”
remedy or “oppression” in Ireland91  in this article, it is clear to this author, if
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not to others92 , that the unfair prejudice remedy will not operate to render
management accountable to the company as a whole, as was required in this
case). As stated by the Court of Appeal in Prudential Assurance v Newman
Industries (No. 2) and as reiterated by Sealy there is a distinction between a
shareholder who wishes to remedy some diminution of the value of his
shareholding or erosion of his or her rights (the English s. 459 or Irish s. 205
remedy) and a shareholder who seeks to remedy a wrong done to the company
through a derivative action brought on behalf of the company. Thus Sealy
states:93
“a shareholder cannot bring a personal claim against a wrongdoer, even
in a claim based on fraud or deceit, when the loss which he claims that he
has suffered is the diminution in the value of his investment in the company
as a consequence of the effect of the fraud on the company. The company
alone can sue for such a wrong.”
The only way therefore for this corporate action to be taken where the controllers
refuse to act is through a derivative action. Unfortunately this action is now so
restrictive under Irish and English law that it is not a real alternative.
Those who argue that the Anglo-American corporate governance structure
is more suitable than continental systems in facilitating investment and capital
liquidity because of better minority shareholder protection devices94  ignore
this and other salient differences on the two sides of the Atlantic. A close and
precise reading of the original judgments in Foss v Harbottle, without the
reinterpretation of principle presented by subsequent judgments, seems to
present a clear understanding that these rules are strongly procedural in character
91. See section 459 of the UK Companies Act 1985 and section 205 of the Irish
Companies Act 1963. Discussion of the relative merits of this action for minority
shareholders is beyond the scope of this article, but the author is firmly of the view
that not all issues can be addressed by this remedy as distinct from other causes of
action, such as the derivative action.
92. For example in Courtney, The Law of Private Companies (2nd ed., Butterworths,
Dublin, 2002) the statement that the section 205 remedy, equivalent to section 459
in the English legislation drives a “coach and four” through the majority rule principle
seems to be overstated to this author. Furthermore the distinction between a corporate
action which can be pursued by a minority through a derivative action and a personal
section 205 action is central to the decision of the Irish Supreme Court in its decision
in O’Neill v Ryan and Ors referred to above n.71.
93. Sealy, above n.60, 502.
94. R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny, “Legal Determinants
of External Finance” (1997) 52 Journal of Finance, 1131. “Law and Finance” (1998)
106 Journal Of Political Economy, 1113 “Corporate Ownership Around the World”
(1999) 54 Journal of Finance 471.
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and may be departed from when necessary to allow a meritorious claim to
proceed. The purpose of Foss v Harbottle has always been understood as
providing internal clarity in relation to governance issues. A secondary concern
has been to prevent loss to the company through vexatious litigation concerning
management decisions. Finally continuous disruption of the conduct of the
internal affairs of a company has been a motivating factor in judicial support of
the majority rule principle. However, cases such as the present one illustrate
the limitations of our current understanding of the Foss v Harbottle principle.
Effectively as it stands no remedy was available to the company to recover the
losses caused by John Rusnak’s trading. This action would have had a far better
chance of success under US state law. Similarly, the standing issue directly
contradicts one of the goals of modern company law: to facilitate investment
through capital markets. The dangers inherent in investing through ADRs and
ADSs are only now becoming apparent.
The cost of governance
The costs of taking a derivative action claim are always considered to be an
additional barrier in the British Isles. It has been observed that in the US,95  the
plaintiff bar is the driver of the derivative action because unlike the plaintiff
there are immediate gains to be taken by the plaintiff’s attorney if the case is
either successful or settled. In the British Isles, the same incentive for the attorney
to act should apply as the lawyer will be paid regardless of the lack of immediate
gain to the plaintiff but the same level of activity is not present. Under the
default costs rule in the United States, there is no disincentive for the plaintiff
or her attorney in that if the action is lost there is no danger of the plaintiff
having to pay the company’s costs and the costs of the other defendants. Even
where the costs rule, normally applicable in the British Isles, that loser pays all
is in normal circumstances a disincentive to litigation, in this particular context,
the disincentive is not as great as it is in other actions. Generally in a derivative
action case, the claimant may seek indemnity for costs from the company as in
Wallersteiner v Moir (No.2),96  although the granting of such indemnity is
dependant on the making out of a prima facie case, or as stated by Walton J. in
Smith v Croft the establishment to the court’s satisfaction that an independent
Board of Directors would in the circumstances have authorized such an action
on behalf of the company. Far from acting as a disincentive, it could be argued
95. M. Dooley, Fundamentals of Corporation Law (Foundation Press, Westbury, New
York, 1995), pp.302–305. See also B.Cheffins, “Reforming the Derivative Action:
The Canadian Experience and British Prospects” [1997] Company, Financial and
Insolvency Law Review 227.
96. [1975] 1 Q.B. 373.
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that this provides some additional assurance for the British or Irish plaintiff’s
lawyer.
On the other hand it is true that for the plaintiff the economic incentive to
take and pursue an action is a lot less than that presented to the management of
the company to defend such an action, particularly in cases such as these. Given
these real financial difficulties, it is extraordinary how, procedurally and
substantively, the law has developed to provide additional disincentives to
prospective plaintiffs. The argument of course can be viewed from two
perspectives. Against the plaintiff shareholder it can be argued that the
availability of the derivative action encourages frivolous and vexatious litigation
and therefore this action needs to be rigorously controlled.97 Alternatively, the
derivative action could be used as a legitimate corporate governance tool to
redress the concerns which all corporate governance scholars have with issues
centred on management accountability and lack of shareholder voice. This article
argues that the derivative action as originally conceived presents a real
opportunity for active corporate governance. Therefore, any recommendations,
such as those emanating in the UK, which provide procedural clarity and
substantive opportunities ought to be welcomed.
Legal rules and private remedies or “non-legally enforceable norm”
This final part considers issues raised by the subsequent actions of the Board
of AIB and its subsidiaries and the subsequent trading history. Allied Irish
Banks continues to be a highly profitable company generating considerable
income from its domestic banking operations, where as was stated at the
beginning of this article it is a major player in what could be described as an
oligopolistic market. It is also successful in other areas. In July 2004 the report
on the half-year to June 2004 noted an increase in earnings per share of 10% to
Euro 64.4 cents and an increase of 13 % in the profitability of, inter alia, its US
operations.98  Because of its profitability in governance terms it continues to
comply with the primary imperative from its shareholders. This is the case
despite the trading losses suffered at the hands of John Rusnak and also despite
considerable trading losses incurred by its other foreign operations, primarily
in Poland.99  Perhaps in response to these difficulties, or otherwise, the last two
97. See Dooley, above n.2.
98. For the full text of the press release from Allied Irish Banks on July 27, 2004, see
www.aibgroup.com accessed on July 29, 2004.
99. See interim report from the company posted on July 29, 2003 which gives profit
and loss statements for the half year to June 30, 2003. This report showed that
whilst Allied Irish Bank figures improved from 2002 to 2003 in its domestic banking
operations from 294 million to 310 million in 2003 and in its operations in Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, from 117 million to 125 million it suffered losses in
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years since this rogue trading scandal have witnessed a number of changes in
AIB. AllFirst was sold, as has been described in the Introduction. There have
been management changes at headquarters in Dublin, in particular a new
Chairman has been appointed who is a member of the Irish bar and a former
Attorney General. Others have resigned. Finally AIB has embarked on a
significant buyback of its shares, including those traded on the NYSE. At this
point it has purchased almost 900,000 shares at the price of 12.40 Euro per
share.100
Throughout the history of this trading scandal it is clear that the Board of
AIB has been very proactive in seeking to allay investor fears in relation to the
losses caused, underscored by the appointment of the investigating team, which
led to the publication of the Ludwig report. The goal presumably is to achieve
some sort of resolution of the issues which this scandal raised, and for the most
part this strategy seems to have been effective. Most shareholders seem to be
content with the resolution if one is to judge by investor confidence as reflected
in share price and by various business and media reports. The shareholders
have laid down their metaphorical swords and why should they not?
On the other hand not all stakeholders may be satisfied. During the summer
of 2004 new problems have continued to be aired by the media causing further
trouble for the management of AIB. These include reported deficits in its pension
funds, questions regarding management involvement in some tax avoidance
schemes, issues regarding overcharging of customers in relation to foreign
trading and irregularities in its student banking activities.101
However, the proactive stance of the Board of AIB and the fact that the
central governance concerns have been satisfied raise interesting theoretical
questions regarding the function of norms as distinct from legal rules, particularly
in this corporate governance context. This has been a matter of considerable
academic debate in the United States where a debate on the relationship between
economic theory and social norms led initially to an investigation of how social
norms affect behaviour in addition to economic motivations.102  This debate
Poland, from 24 million to 8 million and in the United States, from 117 million to
66 million. The report summary also states that “The profit and loss for half year
to June 30, 2003 includes AllFirst up to March 31, 2003 and the Group’s 22.5%
share of M & T’s profit from April 1, 2003.”
100. As of November 2003.
101. “Serious questions raised about AIB’s corporate culture” The Irish Times, June
23, 2004. In addition some serious matters were raised about the relationship
between some senior management at AIB and a British Virgin Island company,
Faldor whose “origins and activities” indicated possible tax evasion. “Unacceptable
deal allocations a ‘thing of the past’–Buckley”, The Irish Times, June 23, 2004.
102. See “Symposium: Law, Economics and Norms” 144 U.Pa.L.Rev. (1996) and
“Symposium: Social Norms, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Law”
27 Journal of Legal Studies 537 (1998).
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has been extended to the relationship between law and norms of behaviour,
usually classified as non-legally enforceable norms.103  One of the points made
by those who consider NLERs to be effective in monitoring managerial
performance is that adherence to norms of behaviour seems to work particularly
well when the nature of the community is closed and where reputational interests
are extremely valuable. This is clearly a useful analysis in this case in view of
the membership of the board of AIB, the importance of reputation to its members
and the close knit character of the Irish business and financial community.104
CONCLUSION
For those of us interested in the larger issues raised by cases such as this many
questions remain as to the adequacy of remedies as expressed in legal rules as
compared with the resolution of these difficulties through the operation of non-
legally enforceable norms. In particular, the derivative action as a minority
shareholder governance mechanism seems to be almost a dead letter. Whether
it can be revived through judicial interpretation and legislative reform is an
important governance question. On the other hand, academics in the United
States have done considerable research on why corporate law is designed to
facilitate the operation of “non-legally enforceable norms” to achieve good
governance outcomes.105  If, as seems to be the case here, the non-legally
enforceable norms work as accountability mechanisms, what role is there for
legal rules of any sort or indeed what role is there for the rules of company law
as they currently stand?106  In light of the inadequacy of legal rules to achieve
the shareholders’ governance requirements in this case, the question simply is
whether good corporate governance is a public good and whether, like justice,
it must be seen to be done? These questions will be returned to in a later article.
At present, the first conclusion is that company law does not seem to be the
most significant governance mechanism available to shareholders or other
stakeholders and management.
103. See further Symposium “Norms and Corporate Law” 149 U.Pa.L.Rev. (2001).
104. See further J.C. Coffee, Jr., “Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation”
149 U.Pa.L.Rev. 2151 (2001).
105. See further E. B. Rock and M.L. Wachter, “Norms and Corporate Law:
Introduction” 149 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1607 (2001)
106. As it happened, because of the international nature of this case, the company law
of a number of jurisdictions influenced the outcome of the case including Irish
company law, (which closely resembles that of existing company law provisions
in the UK,leaving aside for the moment recommendations from the DTI Company
Law Review), the law of the State of Maryland and other US jurisdictions and
several other common law jurisdictions.
